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Although the federal constitutional amendment procedure in Article V of the U.S. Constitution 
has not been altered since its adoption 226 years ago, constitutional tradition in the 50 states 
has substantially evolved. For instance, popular referenda were unknown in 1787, but are 
now ubiquitous in state constitutionalism. Over time, a strong tradition of direct democracy 
and majoritarian voting rules has emerged in almost all states. Nevertheless, scholars have 
often neglected the rich source of state experiments with amendment procedures in the U.S. 
and usually only refer to Switzerland as the prime example of direct democracy and 
(constitutional) referenda. 
According to Article V of the U.S. Constitution, the federal amendment procedure can be 
initiated via the federal or state legislative level. Either a two-thirds vote of both Houses of 
Congress is necessary to propose an amendment or two-thirds of the state legislatures can 
oblige Congress to call a special convention to propose amendments. Hitherto, not a single 
constitutional amendment has been adopted via a proposing convention.[1] In the second 
stage, the proposed amendment needs to be ratified by three-quarters of the states for 
approval. Congress may decide whether the states can act through their legislatures or via 
special ratifying conventions. 
An analysis of these paths to constitutional amendment in Article V of the U.S. Constitution 
leads to the following remarkable observations: 
1. In practice, calling a national proposing convention does not seem to be a preferred or 
feasible option for the states, so that the required two-thirds vote of Congress in the 
proposing phase always constitutes a federal veto power. Consequently, it is unlikely 
to pass amendments limiting the power of Congress or increasing the power of the 
state level.[2] 
2. The equal representation of states in the Senate gives a disproportional amount of 
power to small states in the proposing stage. 
3. The thirteen least populous states – together only representing approximately 4.4%[3] 
of the national population – can block every amendment in the ratification stage. 
4. Last but not least, Article V only involves legislatures and does not provide any 
form of direct democracy, such as initiative petitions or referenda. 
It follows from the last observation that the current amendment process of Article V clearly 
champions federalism over direct involvement of the People. Article V is still reminiscent of 
the initial fear of Southern slavocratic leaders for a popular vote.[4] In addition, in 1787 there 
were no useful examples at the state level which incorporated a detailed amendment process 
including direct involvement of the People. Nevertheless, based on the principle of popular 
sovereignty and a non-exclusive reading of Article V[5] one could argue that the People have 
an inalienable right to alter or abolish the Constitution which they, themselves, have 
ordained and established.[6] According to Akhil R. Amar for instance, Article V does indeed 
not constrain the inalienable right of the People itself to alter the Constitution via a national 
referendum.[7] 
There have been almost 150 state constitutions in the U.S., and they have been amended 
approximately 12,000 times.[8] In contrast to the onerous federal amendment procedure[9], 
the tradition in the states is thus clearly more flexible[10], though maybe too flexible. 
Moreover, this tradition is characterized by direct democracy and majoritarian voting rules: 
 All states, except Delaware[11], require a popular vote after the proposal of 
constitutional amendments by the state legislature.Only Florida (a three-fifths 
supermajority or two-thirds for a new State tax or fee)[12], New Hampshire (a two-
thirds supermajority)[13] and Illinois (a simple majority or three-fifths)[14] depart 
from the state tradition of majoritarian voting rules for constitutional referenda. 
 In eighteen states, voters can also themselves initiate a proposal to amend the 
constitution via petitioning.[15] Once the percentage or number of voters required to 
sign the petition has been achieved, the proposed amendment is put on the ballot for 
ratification. In thirteen states a simple majority of the voters is sufficient.[16] 
Moreover, three states require a certain percentage of votes cast in the election in 
addition to a simple majority voting yes on the particular amendment.[17] Only 
Florida[18] and Illinois[19] require a supermajority (of 60%voting on the proposed 
amendment). Nevertheless, in several states the requirements for this form of direct 
democracy are so strict that it has only been successfully used in a few cases. 
Especially in Illinois, Massachusetts and Mississippi the gates to popular initiative 
have traditionally been extremely difficult to open. Over time, requirements have also 
been made substantially more stringent in Florida, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, 
Oklahoma, and Oregon. 
 24 out of the 40 states in which the constitution explicitly provides how a proposing 
constitutional convention can be called explicitly require a simple majority vote for 
ratification of proposed amendments[20], two states require a 60% vote[21], and New 
Hampshire requires a two-thirds vote. The other thirteen state constitutions do not 
explicitly prescribe which majority of the voters is required.[22] 
States may serve as laboratories, undertaking experiments that can yield useful insights about 
their successes and failures (so-called ‘institutional learning’ or ‘laboratory federalism’[23]). 
In order to develop potential alterations to the federal amendment procedure in Article V, it is 
useful – though often neglected – to look at the tradition of state constitutionalism. This 
tradition could be an important argument in favor of adding more direct democracy via 
initiative petitions[24] and ratifying referenda[25], thereby giving the Constitution back to the 
People. 
Akhil R. Amar has vigorously defended the right of a simple majority of the People to alter 
the constitution.[26] Although he admits that this idea may scare some people[27], it should 
be mentioned that many U.S. citizens are already subjected to a majoritarian voting rule for 
amendments to their state constitution. Moreover, one state is more likely to become 
dominated by a majoritarian view, as opposed to the “safety in numbers” on the federal 
level.[28] Finally, one should realize that not only a tyranny of a majority, but also a tyranny 
of a minority can arise, which could block positive and reasonable reforms favored by a 
strong majority. Obviously, (judicial) safeguards should be developed in order to ensure 
essential human rights and international obligations at all time. 
Bruce Ackerman has also argued to explicitly amend Article V of the U.S. Constitution in 
order to introduce the option of a national referendum. He proposed the following amendment 
process: a President in his/her second term may propose amendments to the U.S. Congress; 
then, if two-thirds of both Houses approve the proposal, it requires 60% of the voters in two 
successive Presidential elections to ratify the amendment.[29] Deliberation is important and 
one should not be able to change the constitution overnight. Nevertheless, the particular 
procedure for this ‘constitutional moment of higher lawmaking’ is too onerous, especially in 
light of the existing constitutional tradition in the states and the problem of gridlock on the 
federal level. 
With regard to the counterargument of federalism, I disagree with Henry Monaghan that 
federalism and the role of the states – as inter alia embedded in James Madison’s notable 
quote in Federalist No. 39 that “[the Constitution is] neither wholly national nor wholly 
federal”[30] – should exclude direct democracy via national referenda.[31] Of course, I 
recognize that one should not neglect the federal structure of the U.S. and consequently 
impose a territorial distribution across the states. 
Moreover, I believe that one does not have to make a choice between representative and direct 
democracy. Both are compatible and could even strengthen each other. Undoubtedly, it is 
time to revive this important debate. 
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